T hough it is rarely appreciated, society has endowed psychiatrists with a unique, great and terrible power. Unlike any other professional group, psychiatrists may order the ongoing lawful detention of people, without independent review, when there is no suspicion that they have, or will, commit a crime (technically, infectiousdisease physicians have similar powers, but in practice they are almost never used). 1 Not only may we detain people, we may treat them despite their express refusal.
Society has given us this power for the best of reasonsso that we may protect the most vulnerable in our community. However, 'with great power comes great responsibility'. a We must apply this power sparingly and only in prescribed circumstances. However, we must also ensure that we use it when its needed and not abandon those whom society has charged that we protect.
The only way to achieve this delicate balance is to understand what the law says and to apply it judiciously and with moral courage. This would be challenging in any circumstances but is made all the more so by the fact that very few psychiatrists have any legal training or ethical expertise. This issue of the journal focuses on ethics and the law, and in this editorial, I draw attention to the crucial need to properly understand the provisions of mental health legislation.
The first step in understanding what legislation means, is to read it. Despite almost all psychiatry registrars regularly detaining people under mental health legislation, in my experience, very few registrars (or psychiatrists) know the criteria that must be met to authorise involuntary detention. Worse, most don't seem to know that they don't know and, when asked the criteria, will confidently reply with provisions of their own imagining.
An example will make this issue clear. The mental health acts of all Australasian jurisdictions contain a criterion that predicates the application of involuntary treatment on concerns about some form of harm coming to the person who is to be subject to detention. The wording of these harm criteria vary across our two nations. In New South Wales (NSW) that harm criterion, as it applies to people with a mental illness, is expressed this way.
That 'owing to that illness, there are reasonable grounds for believing that care, treatment or control of the person is necessary … for the person's own protection from serious harm'.
The section also specifies that in making this judgement 'the continuing condition of the person, including any likely deterioration' ought to be taken into account.
Despite this, many, perhaps most, NSW psychiatrists, when asked about this provision will report that it refers to 'a risk of harm' or 'a serious risk of harm' or 'a risk of serious harm', but none of these versions are correct.
The criterion does not contain the word 'risk' at all. 'Risk' is a forward-looking concept and if the provision were to refer to 'risk', it would arguably require a psychiatrist to make some estimate of the probability that the person would come to the said harm in the future -a task beyond our ken. 2 Fortunately for NSW psychiatrists, estimation of future harms is rarely necessary. It is only required that there be 'reasonable grounds for believing' that the person requires 'protection from serious harm' and that 'care, treatment or control' is 'necessary' to provide this. In most instances no soothsaying is required, as in almost all cases, the serious harm that the person requires protection from is evident at the time of review.
As a general rule, legislation means what legislation says. So 'serious harm' in the above means 'harm' -that is injury, damage or hurt -that is 'serious'. The universe of potentially relevant harms is very broad. It includes not only death and serious physical injury, but also serious financial harms, serious harms to one's relationships and serious harms that flow directly from the experience of psychiatric symptoms, 3 such as serious distress that might be caused by derogatory auditory hallucinations. It might even include serious harm to one's reputation, though doubt was expressed over that particular interpretation by a Court, 3 and judicial interpretation modifies the general rule expressed at the beginning of this paragraph.
Our duty to know and understand the law
If NSW psychiatrists and registrars wrongly believe that the provision refers only to the possibility of future serious self-harm or suicide, as many do, they will not offer protection to many people that require it and are entitled to it. 4 All of this is simply by way of example of the sort of understanding of legislation that all psychiatrists must achieve for all the relevant provisions of their local mental health acts. Though the example I chose might see some psychiatrists lower one of their thresholds for involuntary treatment, I do not mean to argue for a general lowering.
In NSW and most Australasian jurisdictions the threshold for concluding that a person requires some protection from harm is low enough that it will almost always apply to a patient whom a doctor feels would benefit from involuntary admission. 5 However, this harm criterion is balanced by a criterion that requires that involuntary treatment represent the least restrictive means of achieving protection, and recently, in most states, another criterion that demands involuntary treatment not be given over a competent objection. 6 Psychiatrists must seek to understand the meaning of these provisions in the same way.
We are not lawyers but, to best serve our patients and honour the trust that the community has placed in us, we need to understand our little bit of the law. 
